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L INTRODUCTION 
The Charter of the United Nations provides that UN staff 
"shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations 
established by the General Assembly ."1 It follows that the employ-
ment relationship between the United Nations and its staff is not 
subject to national law.2 
Insofar as the United Nations and other international 
organizations are concerned, specific regulatory provisions aimed 
at strikes are a recent innovation.3 As the phenomenon of strikes 
began to appear in international organizations, a number of those 
organizations reacted by withholding the salary of striking 
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1. U.N. CHARTER, art. 101, para. 1. Article 100, paragraph 2 provides that each 
member state of the United Nations "undertakes to respect the exclusively international 
character of the responsiblities of the Secretary-General and the staff .... " 
2. The General Assembly has established Staff Regulations which embody "the 
fundamental conditions of service and the basic rights, duties and obligations of the United 
Nations Secretariat." (Scope and purpose provision, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/Staff Regula-
tions/Rev. 12). Staff Regulation 12.2 gives the Secretary-General power to establish Staff 
Rules to implement the Staff Regulations. The staff are, of course, also governed by applic-
able provisions in the UN Charter and by applicable resolutions and decisions of the 
General Assembly, even though the resolutions and decisions are not incorporated into the 
UN Staff Regulations. The Secretary-General also issues Administrative Instructions, In-
formation Circulars and other general directives dealing with specific matters. The United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal (see note 29 infra) has held that these documents have the 
same force and effect as the UN Staff Rules unless inconsistent with the UN Staff Regula-
tions. See, e.g., Powell v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgments U.N. Ad. 
Trib. No. 237, U.N. Doc. AT/DEC/237 (1979). 
3. Strikes in the United Nations are a relatively recent phenomenon. See note 13 
infra and accompanying text. The 1954 Report on Standards of Conduct in the International 
Civil Service prepared by the International Civil Service Advisory Board, although silent on 
the question of strikes, clearly does not contemplate that such activity would be undertaken 
by international civil servants. U.N. Doc. COORD/CIVIL SERVICE/5 (1954) (see especially 
paras. 56 and 57). 
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officials despite the absence of specific statutory provisions deal-
ing with the consequences of strikes. 
The absence of specific statutory authority to withhold the 
salary of an international civil servant participating in a strike 
was considered in Domergue v. Secretary-General of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).' The claimant took part in a two-day strike in February 
1965 and had two days' pay deducted from his salary. The OECD 
Appeals Board upheld the action of the Administration. The 
Appeals Board pointed out that the salary withholding was a 
necessary consequence of absence from work and, as a result, was 
not dependent upon the existence of statutory authority or 
advance warning. It appears that the Appeals Board was import-
ing into the employment relationship a principle which was con-
sidered so basic that it did not need to be spelled out in the 
employment contract or in a staff regulation or other applicable 
statutory rule; the withholding of salary was a "necessary conse-
quence" of participating in a strike.5 
A possible foundation for this "necessary consequence" was 
suggested in Acton v. The Commission of the European Com-
munities.6 Staff of the various institutions of the European Com-
munities went on strike for five days in December 1972. Eventually 
the Commission decided to withhold salaries of its staff members 
for a period of two days. The Court upheld this decision, noting 
that it was a recognized principle of labour law of the member 
states of the European Communities that employees had no right 
to wages and other benefits pertaining to periods when the 
employees were on strike. 7 The Commission could therefore apply 
this principle to its officials. The Court also noted that upholding 
the salary deduction did not imply any decision on whether the 
officials had the right to strike. Furthermore, as the withholding 
4. O.E.C.D. App. Bd., Decision No. 39 (1965). An English translation appears in 38 
I.L.R. 448 (1969). 
5. Id. at 449. 
6. 1975 European Court Rep. 383. 
7. Id. at 395. The Commission in its submission to the Court provided a detailed com-
parative analysis of the law of member states which demonstrated that no remuneration is 
due to officials in the absence of services rendered, particularly as a consequence of partici-
pation in an organized stoppage of work. The Commission noted that this "principle is ac-
cepted without exception in the Member States, and is of very general application, whether 
it flows from the law, from case-law or simply from accepted administrative practice." Id. at 
390. 
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of salary was merely the consequence of failure to perform official 
duties, it was not a disciplinary measure calling for the utilization 
of the procedures in the applicable Staff Regulation.8 
The application of principles of labour law and the practice of 
member states of an international organization were elevated onto 
a somewhat higher level by the Administrative Tribunal of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) in the case of Rempp v. 
International Patent Institute.9 In that case, the ILO Adminis-
trative Tribunal upheld the action of the International Patent 
Institute in withholding the salary of officials who had partici-
pated in a strike, and noted that according "to a principle of inter-
national public service salary is generally payable only for 
services rendered, and so the Institute was right to refuse to pay 
a staff member who went on strike for the period in which he did 
not work."10 
IL LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF STRIKES BY UN OFFICIALS 
There was a serious work stoppage at the United Nations 
Office at Geneva from 25 February to 3 March 1976. After settle-
ment of the strike by the Secretary-General on terms which 
included no salary withholding, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU)11 
presented a report12 on the strike to the Fifth Committee of the 
General Assembly. The report noted that: 
8. It is noteworthy that the Court also held that absences caused by participation m 
strikes were not within the scope of a Staff Regulation which provided that unauthorized 
absences should be deducted from annual leave, because this provision was aimed at in-
dividual absences and not participation in collective actions. Id. at 395. This Regulation is 
similar to U.N. Staff Rule 105.l(d) which was adopted in 1952, a time when it was clear that 
the Rule was aimed at individual absences and was not aimed at an individual's participation 
in collective actions such as strikes. See note 18 infra. 
9. Int'l Lab. Org. Ad. Trib., Judgment No. 314 (1977). The judgment is summarized in 
(1977] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 174. 
10. Id. at 6. 
11. The Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) is composed of eleven inspectors appointed by the 
General Assembly who serve in their personal capacity. The JIU has broad powers of in-
vestigation in all matters related to the efficiency and functioning of the United Nations and 
other international organizations within the United Nations system which accept the 
Statute of the JIU. The present Statute of the JIU (in force from 1 January 1978), is 
contained in General Assembly Resolution 31/192 of 22 December 1976. G.A. Res. 192, 31 
GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 97) 3, U.N. Doc. A/REs/31/192 (1976). 
12. Report on some aspects of the strike at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 
25 February to 3 March 1976, U.N. Doc. A/31/137 (1976). 
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the General Assembly of the United Nations and the 
general conferences of the various organizations have not 
yet formulated a position of principle concerning the phe-
nomenon of the international civil servants' strike. This 
situation is in no way surprising considering the relatively 
recent origin of this form of action: there were no strikes in 
the international organizations within the United Nations 
family until 1962 (ILO, UNESCO), and no strikes of any 
great length (i.e., several days) until 1974 (the strike at 
FAO, Rome). It is also a well-known fact that there are 
wide divergences between the domestic laws of Member 
States relating to the right of civil servants to strike.13 
The report, nevertheless, recommended that an appropriate 
response to the phenomenon of strikes be formulated. 
In December of that year, the Fifth Committee considered the 
JIU report on the strike. The representative of Japan proposed 
that the draft resolution dealing with the report contain the 
following provision: "no salary shall be paid to staff members in 
respect of periods of unauthorized absence from work unless such 
absence was caused by reasons beyond their control or duly cer-
tified medical reasons."14 In explaining this proposal, he noted that 
it was in response to the spreading phenomenon of work stop-
pages at a number of duty stations and that the proposal was 
made without prejudice to the question whether international civil 
servants have the right to strike.15 This proposal was ultimately 
adopted by the General Assembly on 22 December 1976.16 Staff 
were informed of the terms of the resolution on 17 January 1977.17 
13. Id. at para. 58. 
14. U.N. Doc. A/C.5/31/L. 52 (1976). 
15. U .N. Doc. A/C.5/31/SR.56, para. 81 (1976). 
16. The General Assembly adopted the resolution without debate. The Fifth Committee 
had adopted the Japanese proposal by 77 votes to none with 16 abstentions. 31 U.N. GAOR 
Annex (Agenda Item 97) 1, U.N. Doc. A/31/457/Add. 1, paras. 9-24 (1976). There was no real 
opposition to the Japanese proposal in the Fifth Committee. The doubts that were 
expressed were concerned with the fact that the Secretary-General could deal with 
absences from work under the existing UN Staff Regulations and Rules, e.g., the 
statements by the representative of Sri Lanka (U.N. Doc. A/C.5/31/SR.60, para. 7 (1976)) and 
the representative of France (U.N. Doc. A/C.5/31/SR.60, para. 32 (1976)). The representative 
of Upper Volta was concerned with the fact that the proposal might be an implicit recogni-
tion of the right to strike and that implementation of the proposal might have serious finan-
cial implications, principally establishing surveillance systems to record absences (U.N. Doc. 
A/C.5/31/SR.56, para. 73 (1976)). 
17. U.N. Doc. ST/lC/77/3, para. 21 (1977). 
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The records of the debates contain no explanation for the use 
of the term "unauthorized absence from work" rather than a more 
direct term such as "participation in strikes." Perhaps the reason 
for this was to avoid using the technical legal term "strike" which 
directly raises the difficult question of framing a definition of a 
strike. Furthermore, any such exercise may have involved the im-
plicit recognition of the right of international civil servants to 
strike. A neutral term such as "unauthorized absence" side-steps 
this issue.18 
The Secretary-General applied the resolution three times in 
the period 1977-1978.19 
In December 1978, the Japanese representative in the Fifth 
Committee asked the Director of Personnel "w by the General 
Assembly had not yet been given an opportunity to consider a 
relevant Staff Regulation, which should have been presented to it 
in pursuance of General Assembly Resolution 31/193, concerning 
non-payment of salary to staff members in respect of periods of 
unauthorized absence from work."20 The Secretary-General in a 
Note suggested that the text could be incorporated into the Staff 
Regulations as paragraph 10 of Annex 1.21 The General Assembly, 
on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee, adopted this 
approach.22 The text of the new Staff Regulation and a description 
of the actions of the Assembly was communicated to UN staff on 
24 January 1979.23 The Secretary-General subsequently trans-
18. The term "unauthorized absence" already existed in the UN Staff Rules. Staff 
Rule 105.l(d) provides: "Any absence from duty not specifically covered by other provisions 
in these rules shall be charged to the staff member's accrued annual leave, if any; if the 
staff member has no accrued annual leave, it shall be considered as unauthorized, and pay 
and allowances shall cease for the period of such absence." This rule, however, is aimed at 
individual absences. See note 8 supra. 
19. On 9 and 10 February 1977, some locally recruited staff of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in the West 
Bank went on strike. Two days' salary was withheld from the pay of those staff members. 
On 7 December 1977, a one-day strike took place in the . United Nations Office at 
Geneva. A day's salary was withheld. 
In November-December 1978, a series of rolling strikes occurred among some UNRW A 
staff members. Appropriate salary deductions were made. 
20. U.N. Doc. A/C.5/33/SR.57, para. 74 (1978). 
21. U.N. Doc. A/C.5/33/CRP.9 (1978). Annex I of the Staff Regulations deals with 
salaries and allowances. 
22. General Assembly decision 33/433 of 20 December 1978. 
23. U.N. Doc. ST/IC/79/10 (1979). See also U.N. Doc. ST/1Cn9/5 (1979) which was 
dated 22 January 1979 but which was distributed to the Staff at a later date and described 
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mitted an amended set of Staff Regulations for publication. The 
amended Regulations were available in printed form in June 1979.24 
/IL SMITH V. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
In December 1978, part of the staff of the Department of Con-
ference Services (DCS) of the United Nations held a one and a half 
day work stoppage to protest the introduction into DCS of word-
processing machines with video display terminals. 25 The work 
stoppage was settled on terms which included payment of salary 
for the period of the stoppage. However, the underlying problem 
relating to the introduction of this new technology remained and a 
further work stoppage occurred from 23 January to 12 February 
1979. This work stoppage took the form of a continuous "unit 
meeting" of the Staff Union, 26 interrupted only by two Extraor-
all action taken by the General Assembly on personnel questions during the thirty-third 
session. 
24. U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/Staff Regulations/Rev. 12 (1979). 
25. At its thirty-second session the General Assembly approved proposals relating to 
the introduction of word-processing equipment with video display terminals into the 
English, French and Spanish Typing Units of DCS. G.A. Res. 207, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
(No. 45) __ , U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/207 (1977). During the first half of 1978 concern arose 
among some of the staff regarding possible health hazards resulting from radiation emis-
sions from . the video display terminals. The administration agreed with the staff that in-
dependent outside expertise would be obtained to evaluate the safety of the machines. The 
staff proposed that the evaluation be done by the National Institute of Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH) of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 
The administration agreed to this proposal. The NIOSH study indicated that there were no 
radiation dangers from the machines. See 33 U.N. GAOR, Annex 1 (Agenda Item 100), U.N. 
Doc. A/C.5/33/35, paras. 1-7 (1978). However, some of the staff continued to have misgivings. 
At its 33rd session (1978) the Fifth Committee had before it the results of the NIOSH study, 
a review of this report submitted by the Staff Union in New York explaining the staffs op-
position to the machines based on safety considerations (U.N. Doc. A/C.5/33/CRP.5 (1978)), 
observations of the Secretary-General on these comments (U.N. Doc. A/C.5/33/CRP.6 
(1978)), and heard testimony from the Medical Director of the United Nations (U.N. Doc. 
A/C.5/33/SR.50, paras. 11-25 (1978)). The Fifth Committee recommended that the project 
continue and that the Secretary-General continue to ensure that the use of word-processing 
equipment is monitored adequately and will not involve any health hazards for staff 
members. See U.N. Doc. A/C.5/33/SR.52, para. 48 (1978). This recommendation was adopted 
by the General Assembly. G.A. Res. 116 B. II, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 199, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/33/116 (1978). Opposition on the part of some DCS staff members to the introduction 
of the word-processing machines nevertheless continued. 
26. The Staff Union at Headquarters has approximately sixty Electoral Units each of 
which elects a staff representative and alternate. The Electoral Units are required to meet 
at least once every three months although in practice more frequent meetings are common. 
See Statute of the Staff Union of the United Nations Secretariat, Chapter IX. 
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dinary General Meetings of all staf:F and by a snow storm on 7 
February 1979 which closed the Headquarters building from 2:00 
p.m., with the consequent release from duty of all staff members 
except those engaged in maintaining essential services. The staff 
on job action returned to work after a settlement had been agreed 
upon with the Secretary-General. The settlement included the 
following provision: 
The staff of the Units referred to will return to work im-
mediately with the assurance that, without prejudice to the 
applicability of General Assembly Resolution 31/193 B II, 
there will be no other penalty, nor will there be any 
reprisal taken against any staff member for having partici-
pated or not participated in staff actions.28 
After the return to work agreement, but prior to submission of 
Ms. Smith's test case to the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, 29 the Secretary-General responded to a request for com-
passion made by the Union on behalf of the staff concerned by 
allowing an abatement of twenty-five percent of the salary 
withholding, i.e., each staff member concerned would have only 
seventy-five percent of his salary with-held in respect of the total 
period of absence. This concession by the Secretary-General was 
to influence the outcome of the case. 
The Tribunal pointed out that it was indisputable that the 
staffs attendance at continuous union meetings constituted a 
work stoppage.30 The Tribunal then examined the UN Staff Regu-
lations and Rules and concl~ded: "It is therefore apparent that 
'work' is the fundamental obligation of staff members. Receipt of 
salary is, morever, the essential counterpart to work performed .... 
27. Extraordinary General Meetings require the written request of at least three 
hundred staff members or a decision of the Staff Council which consists of the elected 
representatives of the Electoral Units. See Statute of the Staff Union of the United Nations 
Secretariat, Chapter V. 
28. U.N. Doc. ST/IC/79/15, para. 1 (1979). 
29. The Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations was adopted by 
the General Assembly by Resolution 351 A (IV) of 24 November 1949 and amended by 
Resolution 782 B (VIII) of 9 December 1953, and by Resolution 957 (X) of 8 November 1955. 
Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Statute provides: "The Tribunal shall be competent to hear 
and pass judgment upon applications alleging non-observance of contracts of employment of 
staff members of the Secretariat of the United Nations or the terms of appointment of such 
staff members. The words 'contracts' and 'terms of appointment' include all pertinent 
regulations and rules in force at the time of alleged non-observance, including the staff 
pension regulations." 
30. U.N. Doc. AT/DEC/249, para. II (1979). 
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The unauthorized absence from work or attendance at the place of 
work while failing to perform duties removes the basis for pay-
ment of salary ."31 
This conclusion is in line with the recognized principles of 
labour law which were adopted in Acton,82 and with the principles 
of international public service which were applied in Rempp.38 
However, although these cases were cited in argument, the 
Tribunal did not explicitly refer to any general principles of law or 
practice but confined itself to interpreting the law which governed 
the employment relationship of UN officials, i.e., regulations 
established by the General Assembly and by the Secretary-
General acting with the authority of the Assembly. 
The Tribunal then examined the terms of the resolution upon 
which the Secretary-General had relied to withhold salaries. The 
Tribunal, after pointing out that the resolution was aimed at work 
stoppages,34 turned to the contention of the Applicant that the 
resolution was not effective until it had been incorporated into the 
UN Staff Regulations. Insofar as this argument was applicable to 
all resolutions, it was apparently founded on the contention that 
paragraph 1 of Article 101 of the UN Charter in using the terms 
"regulations established by the General Assembly" meant only 
UN Staff Regulations and not any other applicable decisions of the 
General Assembly. In relation to this particular resolution, the 
argument was founded upon the contention that the 1978 decision 
of the General Assembly to incorporate the resolution into the UN 
Staff Regulations did not reflect an intention to emphasize the im-
portance of the resolution by incorporating it into the document 
embodying the "fundamental conditions of service" of the UN 
Secretariat, but rather indicated that the Assembly had intended 
the resolution to be operative only upon incorporation into the 
Staff Regulations. The Tribunal rejected these contentions: "The 
31. Id. at para. III. The Tribunal relied on (1) UN Staff Regulation 1.2 which provides 
that the whole time of staff members is at the disposal of the Secretary-General although 
the Secretary-General is to establish a normal working week; (2) UN Staff Rule 101.2(c) 
which provides, that a staff member shall be required to work beyond the normal tour of 
duty when requested to do so; and (3) UN Staff Rule 103.8 which provides that salary 
increments are subject to satisfactory performance. 
32. See note 6, supra. 
33. See note 9, supra. 
3~. U.N. Doc. AT/DEC/249, para. V (1979). The Tribunal examined the travaux 
preparatoires to confirm that interpretation. 
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Tribunal has consistently maintained that the resolutions of the 
General Assembly constitute, as far as the staff members to whom 
they apply are concerned, conditions of employment to be taken 
into account by the Tribunal."35 In any case, the Tribunal pointed 
out that the resolution had been incorporated into the Staff 
Regulations prior to the commencement of the strike.36 
The Tribunal then rejected a series of arguments which at-
tempted to establish that the Secretary-General was estopped 
from relying on the resolution. The only argument of general 
interest was the contention that the Secretary-General, by permit-
ting the striking staff members to meet on UN premises and use 
UN facilities, impliedly indicated to the staff that their attendance 
at the meetings was not an "unauthorized absence from work" 
within the meaning of the resolution. The Tribunal tersely 
disposed of this argument by noting that "the granting of physical 
facilities for staff meetings by the Respondent cannot reasonably 
be held to deprive him of the right to apply the General Assembly 
resolution."37 
The Tribunal finally turned to the question of whether the en-
tire period of the strike, i.e., from 23 January to 12 February 1979, 
constituted an "unauthorized absence from work" within the 
meaning of the resolution. The Tribunal pointed out that it was 
clear "that since an impending snow storm in the afternoon of 7 
February 1979 caused the Respondent to authorize most of the 
staff to go home, the Applicant could legitimately avail herself of 
that authorization" .38 Paradoxically, staff members on strike were 
thus in a better position than staff members who were on authorized 
leave, since leave credits were still charged in respect to absence 
during the afternoon. 39 
The Tribunal was more troubled with the distinction between 
the various types of union meetings. Had the Respondent not 
granted an abatement in respect of the Extraordinary General 
35. Id. at para. VII. 
36. Id. at para. VI. 
37. Id. at para. IX. 
38. Id. at para. X. 
39. The Administrative Instruction governing the release of Headquarters staff 
members in bad weather or other conditions provides, inter alia, that "staff who are on sick 
leave, authorized annual leave or other leave will not be given any additional leave time; 
their absences will be charged to their leave entitlements." (See U.N. Doc. ST/Al/260, para. 
6) (1978). 
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Meetings of all staff, it is doubtful whether the Tribunal would 
have considered that attendance at any union meeting during the 
period of the strike was an authorized absence from work. But in 
the particular circumstances of this case, the Tribunal apparently 
felt constrained to make a distinction between the various forms of 
meetings which took place during the strike: 
The meeting on Friday, 26 January 1979, which lasted all 
day and the meeting during the morning of Monday, 29 
January 1979 were, under the terms of the Statute of the 
Staff Union, "extraordinary staff meetings"; they were un-
doubtedly particularly long; the Respondent himself, how-
ever, held that attendance at those meetings could not be 
described as unauthorized absence and the Tribunal 
recognizes that that interpretation, based as it is on provi-
sions concerning staff members' right of association, must 
be accepted. 
With regard to the unit meetings, the Tribunal finds 
that their objective was in fact organized work stoppage 
and that accordingly participation could not be considered 
as authorized absence inasmuch as no provision concerning 
unit meetings allows for their having such an objective.4° 
IV. CON CL US/ON 
The judgment of the Tribunal that there is no entitlement to 
salary for periods of strike is in accord with the conclusions reached 
by the other international tribunals in Domergue, Acton and 
Rempp. However, while Acton and Rempp went beyond the par-
ticular international organization's staff rules to reach that conclu-
sion, the judgment of the Tribunal confined itself to the UN Staff 
40. U.N. Doc. AT/DEC/249, para. X (1979). It is, with respect, not so readily apparent 
that the Secretary-General held that attendance at the Extraordinary General Meetings 
could not be described as an unauthorized absence. On 13 February 1979, the President of 
the Staff Committee had asked the Secretary-General to exercise compassion in the applica-
tion of the resolution since, inter alia, other staff (i.e., those not participating in the job ac-
tion) had attended the General Meetings and had not had their salary withheld in respect of 
that attendance. In granting a 25% abatement of the salary withholding, the Secretary-
General stated that there may be room for argument as to the applicability of the resolution 
to all of the periods of absence of the staff members who had had salary withheld. See U .N. 
Doc. ST/IC/79/15. Annex (1979). This is hardly a holding that attendance at the General 
Meetings by striking DCS staff members constituted an authorized absence for which 
salary was payable. 
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Regulations and Rules, thereby upholding the traditional view 
that an international official's employment relationship with an 
international organization is governed solely by the rules of that 
organization. 
Although the Tribunal held that part of the period on strike 
was an "authorized absence" from work, it is clear that attendance 
by striking UN staff members at the extraordinary general meet-
ings of 26 and 29 January was considered an "authorized absence" 
from work for the purposes of the resolution only because of the 
particular circumstances of this case. Should a future collective 
work stoppage take place, and should this stoppage take the form 
of extraordinary general meetings rather than unit meetings, it 
can hardly be doubted that the Tribunal would uphold the action 
of the Secretary-General should he decide to withhold salary, 
either pursuant to the terms of the resolution or under the more 
general powers conferred on the Secretary-General by the pro-
visions of the UN Staff Regulations and Staff Rules cited by the 
Tribunal as establishing the fundamental proposition that receipt 
of salary is the essential counterpart of work performed.41 
41. See note 31 supra. 
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